Newsgroups: rec.food.veg
\nFrom: altar@beaufort.sfu.ca (Ted Wayn Altar)
\nSubject: Plant Pain
\nMessage-ID:
\nSender: news@sfu.ca
\nOrganization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada
\nDate: Fri, 18 Dec 1992 16:54:17 GMT
\nLines: 389<\/p>\n
[This document contains both parts concatenated.]<\/p>\n
I see that the old chestnut of “plant pain” has again been
\ninvoked. Apparently, this is a common argument and so, dear
\nreader, permit me to re-post an older message of mine that
\nattempts to address this issue in a discursive, but also
\nhumourous manner.<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\tHappy Holiday Season,<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t ted<\/p>\n
THE DIVERSIONARY TACTIC OF PLANT PAIN<\/p>\n
TED ALTAR<\/p>\n
A. HOW MIGHT CHARLES DARWIN RESPOND?<\/p>\n
With respect to this extravagant debate on plant pain we
\nhave at hand a most promiscuous adjoining of some verified
\nfacts with improper inferences. This reminds me of a story
\n(probably apocryphal as are so many of the best anecdotes)
\nabout Charles Darwin who in his later years was the guest of
\na family whose two boys approached him with a clever
\ndeception. Using some old desiccated specimens of insects,
\nthey had deftly attached the wings of a butterfly, the head
\nof a beetle and the legs of a grasshopper to the body of a
\ncentipede. “We have this strange bug we caught some time
\nago” they innocently said, “Can you tell us what it might
\nbe?” Darwin squinted and examined it as best he could and
\nasked, “Can you remember if it hummed when you caught it?”
\nhe asked in all seriousness. Without smirking, the boys
\nanswered yes, whereupon Darwin replied, “Just as I thought,
\nit is a humbug!”<\/p>\n
B. THE SPECIOUS INFERENCE OF PLANT PAIN.<\/p>\n
No doubt we all have been amazed by much “humbug” on this
\nconference, but maybe no greater example is to be given than
\nthat of “plant pain”. Those whose common sense remains
\nintact will have no difficulty in accepting as sufficient
\nthe following:<\/p>\n
1. Our best science to date shows that plants lack any
\n semblance of a central nervous system or any other system
\n design for such complex capacities as that of a conscious
\n suffering from felt pain.<\/p>\n
2. Plants simply have no evolutionary need to feel pain.
\n Animals being mobile would benefit from the ability to sense
\n pain; plants would not. Nature does not create gratuitously
\n such complex capacities as that of feeling pain unless there
\n should be some benefit for the organism’s survival.<\/p>\n
Well, as Oliver Goldsmith realistically observed, “Every
\nabsurdity has its champions to defend it”. And yes, we
\nhave some defenders who would ignore common sense and argue
\nfor plant pain. Remarkable!. But maybe not so remarkable
\nif we keep in mind the motivation for such humbug. The
\nfollowing argument has repeated been voiced against the
\nconcern of us who would forward greater regard for the
\nwoefully neglected and grievous suffering of those sentient
\ncreatures who cannot defend, nor articulate in words, their
\nplight. The following `reductio ad absurdum’ is supposed to
\nsuffice as an irrefutable trashing of animal rights.<\/p>\n
Premise(1) If a sentient being can consciously experience
\n pain and suffering, then it is wrong to inflict
\n pain & suffering on such a sentient being
\n Premise(2) Plants are sentient beings that can experience
\n pain & suffering
\n Conclusion: It is wrong to inflict pain & suffering on plants.<\/p>\n
In order to challenge the acceptability of premise(1), the
\nanti-AR would have us believe that such a premise
\nineluctably leads to the absurd conclusion as stated above.
\nIn order to achieve this coup de grace of animal rights, the
\nanti-AR who would give little or no coin to premise (1),
\nwould instead introduce the claims of premise(2) as somehow
\n“scientifically established”. In order to debunk animal
\nrights as foolish, the anti-AR would first have us believe
\nin the reality of “plant pain”. Hence, they would attempt
\nto bury AR into a hole but ironically by first bulldozing a
\nmuch deeper one for themselves.<\/p>\n
E. “EVERY ABSURDITY HAS ITS CHAMPIONS TO DEFEND IT”<\/p>\n
You say that I am merely spinning my wheels on a straw man?
\nThen permit me to quote from two of the most loquacious and
\narticulate promoters of plant “pain” on this conference.<\/p>\n
Poster A would bait us with the following argument, an
\nargument that presumably he still holds as having merit by
\nvirtue of his repeated postings of this worn polemic:<\/p>\n
AR: “You’re crude and unfeeling; you’d probably laugh
\n at your mother’s death.”
\n non-AR: “That’s silly, my mother is a human. A deer isn’t.”
\n AR: “Deer can suffer, and so do cattle…so I don’t eat meat.”
\n non-AR: “You apparently have no problem killing plants, though.”
\n AR: “It’s not the same. Plants aren’t animals.”
\n non-AR: “You’re killing a living thing for food, nevertheless.”
\n AR: “But it can’t feel; it’s not sentient; it has no nervous
\n system.”
\n non-AR: “Does dissimilarity rule out ‘pain’?”
\n AR: “Yes.”
\n non-AR: “That’s completely illogical and unscientific.”<\/p>\n
Note how Poster A would invoke the authority of logic and
\nscience as “completely” on his side. Next, consider the
\nassertions of Poster B:<\/p>\n
As a plant molecular biologist with quite a few
\n refereed papers on the subject of cellular
\n communication in plants, please allow me to debunk the
\n unsubstantiated mythology described above. Plants have
\n no *need* to feel pain? Ridiculous.<\/p>\n
When a plant is attacked by an herbivorous insect,
\n might it not be in the best interest of the plant to
\n mobilize its chemical defenses in other parts of the
\n plant in anticipation of further insect attack? When a
\n leaf is infected by a pathogenic fungus, might the rest
\n of the plant wish to bolster its chemical and enzymatic
\n defenses against the spread of the pathogen? News
\n flash — the plant *would* benefit, hence the
\n development of a systemic (throughout the plant)
\n response to local tissue damage by herbivores and
\n pathogens. (Many) references available upon request.
\n It might easily be argued that *because* plants can’t
\n move they need effective chemical defenses and
\n effective detection and communication. This is the
\n case. You may doubt the sensory and integrative
\n abilities of plants, so I invite you to spend a few
\n weeks in my lab and learn the truth. Plants don’t have
\n nerves, since they don’t share a particularly recent
\n common ancestor with animals. Plants feel tissue
\n injury and respond quickly, precisely, and with an
\n effective battery of defenses. They don’t feel *like
\n us*, but it would be a mistake to say that they *don’t
\n feel*.<\/p>\n
Here we have the authority of logic, science and “truth”
\nbeing imprecated against the sorry state of AR nescience and
\n“mythology”. Yet, no single published book, or paper in a
\nscientific journal, has been cited as indeed making this
\nclaim that “plants feel pain”. Sure, there is interesting
\nevidence about plants reacting to local tissue damage and
\neven sending signalling molecules serving to stimulate
\ncertain chemical defenses of nearby plants. But what has
\nthis got to do with supporting the only morally relevant
\nclaim worth considering, namely that “plants FEEL AND SUFFER
\nfrom pain”? Where are the scientific references for this
\nputative fact?<\/p>\n
Now, dear reader, please be patient with my indulgence to
\ndevelop a reasoned reply to such assertive and authoritative
\npronouncements about plant pain.<\/p>\n
C. A REDUCTIO ON A REDUCTIO<\/p>\n
Although the plant pain promoters are fond of reductios,
\nthey will not likely appreciate the following extension of
\ntheir own. By their “logic”, it would equally be the case
\nthat rain clouds behave purposefully in the sense that they
\ncould be said to functionally remove, by way of raining,
\nexcessive moisture that is causing their overstaturation.
\nFurthermore, rain clouds bear meaningful information about
\ntheir level of oversaturation in the form of weight relative
\nto volume. Do not clouds, therefore, “sense” (in some
\ntortured notion of the word) when atmospheric pressure is
\ninsufficient for their moisture content to remain in a
\nvaporous state? The promoters of plant pain would have us
\nbelieve, against our good common sense, that by the mere
\npresence of purposive BEHAVIOURS of avoidance and REACTIONS
\nto tissue damage in plants we therefore must attribute to
\nplants mental states like that of some kind of “felt pain”.
\nWell, then by the same logic we must do the same to clouds.
\nIn the hole that these promoters of plant pain would dig for
\nthemselves, not only must we accept the thesis of plant
\npain, we would also have to swallow some notion of “cloud
\nsentience”!<\/p>\n
D. THE BEHAVIOURAL INFERENCE OF MENTAL STATES<\/p>\n
Lest we forget the ultimate point of what follows, let us
\nnot forget the central thesis of AR. Simply stated: to the
\nextent other animals share with us, at least to some degree,
\ncertain morally relevant attributes, then to that extent we
\ncannot ignore, for the purposes of consistency or justice,
\ngiving due regard and concern towards those animals. Two
\nattributes that are arguably relevant are:<\/p>\n
1. our commonly shared interest in the avoidance of
\n pain and suffering.<\/p>\n
2. and the quality of other animals also being
\n subjects-of-a-life which matters to them as to how such
\n a life fares well or ill.<\/p>\n
Both these qualities posit other animals having certain
\nmental states. Also note that in order to speak of “mental
\nstates” proper, we would denote, as common usage would
\ndictate, that such states are marked by consciousness. It
\nis simply insufficient to mark off mental states by only the
\npresence of purposefulness or intentionality since many
\nobjects, like thermostats and hand calculators, possess
\npurposeful-looking behaviours or are in an information-
\nbearing state.<\/p>\n
Let us further observe that the attribution of morally
\nrelevant mental states to even humans was at one time an
\nissue of contention. For example, consider the case of that
\nvery prestigious scientific apologist of his society’s
\nambient prejudices, Silas Mitchell, founder of American
\nneurology. He claimed that civilized men suffered pain in a
\nfar more ethically relevant manner:<\/p>\n
“In our process of being civilized we have won . . .
\n intensified capacity to suffer. The savage does not
\n feel pain as we do” [1].<\/p>\n
Today, we can witness a similar prejudice that animals do
\nnot suffer pain to the same capacity as we do. For
\ninstance, a cow after surgery will right away start eating
\ngrass, therefore it will be said that the cow cannot be
\nsuffering from post-surgery pain. Just as with the stoic
\n“savage”, who is to say that a cow is not likewise simply
\nbearing the pain more “heroically” since, as with the non-
\ncivilized human, food is more of an imperative than moaning
\nwith pain; indeed, what else can they do?<\/p>\n
So then, how do we properly attribute the existence of
\nmental states to other animals, or even to ourselves for
\nthat matter, since in the past we have certainly made
\nmistakes on this score? As we have seen, the *criterion of
\noutward functional behaviour* has been faulty with even
\nhumans. Yet, our plant pain promoters would employ this
\nsame criterion at a different level, turn things on their
\nhead and argue that because plants react to noxious stimuli,
\nthey therefore feel pain. Now, if the inference of pain
\nfrom overt behaviours has been faulty for attributing pain
\nwhere we now know pain most assuredly exists, then it is
\nprobably equally faulty in attributing pain where pain does
\nnot exist. If reactions or behaviours were sufficient, then
\nwe would have to say that a mere toy doll crying and
\nwriggling, when triggered to do so by certain stimuli, was
\nindeed in pain.<\/p>\n
Similarly, we cannot infer the presence of felt pain simply
\nby the presence of a sub-class of behaviours which are
\nfunctional for an organism’s amelioration or avoidance of
\nnoxious stimuli. Thermostats obviously react to thermal
\nchanges in the environment and respond in a functionally
\nappropriate manner to restore an initial “preferred” state
\nthereby maintaining an equilibrium of the status quo. We
\nwould be dirt foolish, however, to then attribute to
\nthermostats that therefore they must “sense” or “feel” some
\nkind of “pain”. Even warning quotes around our terms don’t
\nprotect us from such an catachrestic absurdity.<\/p>\n
Clearly, the behavioral criterion of even functional
\navoidance\/defense reactions, is simply not sufficient nor
\neven necessary for the proper attribution of pain as a felt
\nmental state. This is not to say that it is completely
\nirrelevant for it can at least index the presence of pain in
\nthose creatures we already know or have good reason to
\nbelieve experience and suffer pain. Behaviour by itself
\ndoes not index pain in our toy doll or thermostat, but
\nbehaviour does usefully index the occurrence of pain and
\nsuffering in those animals that we already have reason to
\nbelieve have the capacity to suffer.<\/p>\n
E. THE RELEVANCE OF SPECIALIZED STRUCTURE<\/p>\n
To state the obvious, science, including the biological
\nsciences, are generally committed to the working assumption
\nof scientific materialism or physicalism [2]. Now, unless
\nthe “new” biology has returned to some arcane version of
\nvitalism or dualism, then we must start with the generally
\naccepted scientific assumption that matter is the only
\nexistent or real primordial constituent of the universe.<\/p>\n
Let it be said at the outset that scientific materialism as
\nsuch does not preclude the existence of emergent or
\nfunctional qualities like that of mind, consciousness, and
\nfeeling (or even, dare I say it, free will), but all such
\nqualities are dependant upon the existence of organized
\nmatter. If there is no hardware, there is nothing for the
\nsoftware to run on. If there is no intact, living brain,
\nthere is simply no mind. Now, just for the record it should
\nalso be said that even contemporary versions of dualism or
\nmind-stuff theories will also make depended their embodied
\nmental states in this world on the presence of sufficiently
\norganized matter.<\/p>\n
To briefly state the case, what is referred to as non-
\nreductive materialism [3] would simply consider cognitive
\nfunctions like consciousness and mind as emergent properties
\nof sufficiently organized matter. Just as breathing is a
\nfunction of a complex system of organs referred to
\naggregately as the respiratory system, so too is
\nconsciousness a function of the immensely complex
\ninformation-processing capabilities of a central nervous
\nsystem. Now, according to such a neo-functionalist account
\nof mental states, HOW the matter is organized and in with
\nWHAT materials is not necessarily delimited to the mammalian
\nbrain. It is possible in theory, that our Alpha Centaurians
\nwho evolved from carrots could equally instantiate some
\n“higher” functions of consciousness. This may even be
\npossible with a future computer given a sufficiently complex
\nand orderly organization of its hardware and clever
\nsoftware. While such a computer does not yet exist, and we
\ndon’t yet know about those Alpha Centaurians, we DO know
\nthat certain living organisms on this planet do possess the
\nrequisite complexity of specialized and highly organized
\nstructure for the emergence of mental states.<\/p>\n
In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain,
\nbut IF, AND ONLY IF there is a requisite complexity of
\norganized plant tissue which could serve to INSTANTIATE the
\nkinds of complex information processing that is prerequisite
\nto such higher order mental states as that of consciousness
\nand felt pain. A mammalian brain is not necessary but an
\nimmensely complex hierarchically organized central processor
\nof some form would be.<\/p>\n
Now, where is the morphological evidence that such a
\ncomplexity of tissue in plants exist? Single cells or even
\naggregates of surrounding tissue is not sufficient for there
\nto be a functional state of felt pain any more than even
\ntodays complex integrated circuit chips evince consciousness
\nof any kind. A lot is required and plants just don’t have
\nit. This is not to say that they cannot exhibit complex
\nreactions, but we are simply OVER-INTERPRETING such
\nreactions when they are designated as “felt pain”.<\/p>\n
With respect to all mammals, birds, and reptiles, we know
\nthat they possess a sufficiently complex neural structure to
\nenable felt pain plus an evolutionary need for such
\nconsciously felt states. They possess complex and
\nspecialized organizations of tissue call sense organs, they
\npossess a specialized and complex structure for processing
\ninformation and for centrally orchestrating appropriate
\nbehaviours in accordance with mental representations,
\nintegrations and reorganizations of that information. The
\nproper attribution of felt pain in these animals is well
\njustified, but it is not for plants by any stretch of the
\nimagination.<\/p>\n
ted<\/p>\n
I. REFERENCES<\/p>\n
[1] Cited from M. Pernick’s (1985) “A CALCULUS OF SUFFERING:
\n PAIN, PROFESSIONALISM AND ANESTHESIA IN 19TH C.
\n AMERICA. New York: Columbia University Press. Cited
\n in turn in Bernard Rollin’s (1989), “THE UNHEEDED CRY:
\n ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ANIMAL PAIN AND SCIENCE”.
\n Oxford: Oxford University Press. I would strongly
\n recommend Rollin’s book as a very well argued and
\n documented scholarly work on this important issue.<\/p>\n
[2] Burtt, E. A. (1924). THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
\n MODERN SCIENCE. London: Routledge & Kegan
\n[3] See Flanagan, Owen’s THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND (2n ed).
\n Mass.: The MIT Press. Provides for a good review of
\n these issues.
\n THE FALLACIES BEHIND THE PLANT PAIN ARGUMENT<\/p>\n
Many are destined to reason wrongly, others, not to
\n reason at all; and others, to persecute those who do
\n reason. (Voltaire)<\/p>\n
How, then, could anybody seriously entertain this humbug of plant
\npain? Is it not remarkable that the most persistent and
\narticulate of the anti-AR would forward such contentious and
\nprima facie absurd claims. But I guess it is not so remarkable
\nif we keep in mind their dogged intent to debunk the claims of
\nanimal rights, seemingly no matter at what cost to good sense,
\nrationality, or even established scientific fact. Since, as we
\nhave seen, many would claim to be avowed ethical subjectivists,
\nat least when it is convenient to do so, I guess we should not be
\nsurprised that rationality and intellect is merely made sullied
\nhandmaidens for advancing their quest to discredit the case for
\nanimal rights.<\/p>\n
What follows, dear reader, are five of the common flaws of reason
\nmasquerading as arguments on behalf of plant rights.<\/p>\n
1. Error #1: THE ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIUM<\/p>\n
In the name of open-mindedness, we are asked to take seriously
\nthe claim of plant pain because the disbelievers and the
\nincredulous simply cannot prove that plants have no felt pain, or
\nthat our knowledge of such things as with many other things, is
\nsimply incomplete and uncertain. For instance, it has been said
\nthat:<\/p>\n
“The simple fact that “cruelty” cannot be DIS-proved
\n introduces reasonable doubt into this argument.”<\/p>\n
Here we have the presumption of innocence found in a court of law
\nbeing inappropriately transferred to how scientific theories are
\nto be established or seriously entertained. Normally, we would
\nargue on BEHALF of a scientific theory by presenting evidence for
\nit, not by pointing to our current lack of evidence unless one is
\narguing AGAINST a theory. The plant pain promoters would turn
\nthe logic of scientific justification on its head.<\/p>\n
Now, in a general or ultimate sense it is TRIVIALLY TRUE that
\nthere is no final “proof” against such wild notions, but then
\nthere is also no ultimate proof against unicorns or ghosts. It
\nis a well known INFORMAL FALLACY to conclude from a lack of
\ndisproof for something’s existence that it therefore exists or
\nmust be taken as a serious possibility for existence. That is to
\nsay, it is simply false to argue that a proposition is true
\nsimply on the basis that it has not been proved false. The idea
\nhere is to try to persuade people of a proposition which avails
\nitself of facts and reasons the falsity or inadequacy of which is
\nnot readily discerned.<\/p>\n
This flawed logic is technically referred to by logicians as the
\n“ARGUMENTUM AD IGNORANTIUM” (argument from ignorance). This is a
\nlogically invalid argument, one that would exploit our common
\nignorance of things. Now, you might ask, why shouldn’t we permit
\nspeculative theories to enter into our foundation of ethics.
\nConsider, however, the following example:<\/p>\n
“no breath of scandal has ever touched the mayor,
\n therefore she is MUST be incorruptibly honest”.<\/p>\n
Maybe she is and maybe she is not, but our ignorance does not
\nestablish the truth or falsity of the conclusion that she is
\nincorruptibly honesty. It is simply unfair to employ our
\nignorance as the sole basis of support for some social\/public
\nconcern.<\/p>\n
Similarly, what we DO KNOW about how animals experience pain and
\nsuffering is of relevance for a system of public ethics. What we
\ndo know about plants is that they DO NOT HAVE a nervous system
\nnor a structure at the cellular level designed to process
\ninformation in a manner that would conceivably enable a conscious
\nsuffering of pain or discomfort. What we do NOT YET KNOW about
\nthe workings of plants, of how consciousness in general is
\nenabled, or of how the universe as a whole works, is simply not
\nrelevant. It is one thing to plea for open-mindedness, it is
\nquite another to promote intellectual promiscuity under the same
\nbanner.<\/p>\n
2. Error #2: EQUIVOCATION OF TERMS TO BOOTLEG A FALSE
\nCONCLUSION<\/p>\n
To understand this very slippery and flawed reasoning that
\nlogicians refer to as the informal fallacy of EQUIVOCATION,
\nconsider the following example:<\/p>\n
“The end of a thing is its perfection;
\n death is the end of life;
\n hence, death is the perfection of life”<\/p>\n
Note the two senses of the word “end” and how the last part of
\nthe sentence confuses them. The word “end” may mean either
\n“goal” or “last event”. Both meanings are legitimate, but to
\nconfuse the two in an argument is a fallacy. In the example
\nabove we have two legitimate premises but a false conclusion that
\ndoes not follow from the premises, unless we remove the
\nequivocation and rewrite, say, the first premise as:<\/p>\n
“The LAST EVENT of a thing is its perfection”.<\/p>\n
But such a premise is patently false.<\/p>\n
This is exactly the kind of flawed argumentation that is
\noccurring with our promoters of plant pain. For instance, the
\nterm “sentient” is deemed applicable to plants given ONE of its
\nmeanings to simply be the “responsiveness to sensory stimuli”.
\nAfter arguing further that what plants do at a molecular level
\ncan be deemed a “sensory response”, even thought they do not
\npossess specialized organizations of tissue called sense organs
\n(see error #3 below), they would then have us accept the
\ndesignation that plants are “sentient”.<\/p>\n
Let us, for the sake of argument, accept their twisted meaning of
\nthe term of “sentient” to simply mean a functional reaction on a
\nbiochemical or cellular level to noxious or warning stimuli. In
\nthis sense, they will argue that a plant can be said to be
\n“sentient”. But at a different juncture they would then have us
\nconclude that because plants are indeed “sentient” they also
\n“feel” tissue injury or assault as “unpleasant”! What the wily
\nplant pain promoters have done is simply bootleg a false
\nconclusion by switching between two quite difference meanings of
\nthe word “sentient”. Permit me to lay it out:<\/p>\n
premise 1: Plants are responsive to “sense” impressions
\n premise 2: As defined in the dictionary, anything
\n responsive to sense impressions are sentient
\n conclusion 1: Plants are sentient<\/p>\n
Note that premise 1 employs the word “sense” in a very
\nrestrictive manner to mean, for the plant pain promoters,
\n“reactions to certain stimuli”. Now, for them to jump from this
\nminimal and idiosyncratic usage of “sentient” to the issue of
\nplant pain, our wily abusers of ordinary language IMPLICITLY are
\nforwarding something like the following argument.<\/p>\n
conclusion 1: Plants are sentient
\n premise 3: Sentient beings are conscious of sense
\n impressions
\n conclusion 2: plants are conscious of sense impressions<\/p>\n
premise 4: To be conscious of a noxious stimuli is felt as
\n unpleasant
\n conclusion 3: noxious stimuli to plants is unpleasant<\/p>\n
From unpleasant we then arrive at plant pain. Of course, our
\nplant promoters will protest that they never said that plants
\nhave “consciousness” or “feel” pain, but only that they respond
\nin a manner similar to how we respond to pain. Well, if that be
\ntruly the only claim and no more, then there is simply no
\nrelevance whatsoever of such an idiosyncratic notion plant “pain”
\nto the real ethical issue of animals suffering from felt pain.
\nIf it is not irrelevant, then we have either one of 2 results:<\/p>\n
1. equivocating on usage of “sentient” to bootleg a false
\n conclusion. This is a logical, not a semantic, fallacy.<\/p>\n
2. redefining what ordinary people mean by pain and
\n suffering so that these terms no longer refer to a conscious
\n awareness of pain\/suffering. Now we have the error of
\n irrelevant re-definition. This brings us to the next error
\n of reasoning.<\/p>\n
3. Error #3: LOGOMACHY OR “LET’S PLAY RE-DEFINITION”<\/p>\n
. For most people, “sentient” designates the capacity to feel.
\nThat is, it would refer to a mental state, not a mere set of
\nbehaviours. The Oxford English Dictionary list 3 core meanings,
\nof which the plant pain promoters will selectively choose only
\none, it being the most minimal definition, namely:<\/p>\n
“def 2: Phys. Of organs or tissues: responsive to sensory
\n stimuli.”<\/p>\n
Of course, they do not look any further. If they were, they
\nmight be surprised to discover that the word “sensory” refers to
\nthe organs of “sense” or belonging to “sensation” In turn, the
\nwords “sense” and “sensation” refers to the organs or mental
\nstates of perception, of psychical affection, of consciousness,
\netc. Indeed, it is designated right at the beginning that
\n“sensation” is “now commonly the subjective element in the
\noperation of the senses; psychical feeling” (OED). The meanings
\nthat predominate refer to mental states, and as we have noted,
\nall mental states are marked by consciousness. Yet, our plant
\npain promoters ignore these obvious conventions of ordinary word
\nmeanings and would legislate their own. And what motivates this
\nre-definition of our terms? Certainly, not to promote clarity or
\nscientific accuracy. If plants have “pain” but no consciousness
\nthen what are we to make of such muddy oxymorons as that of an
\n“unconscious pain” or an “unfelt pain”?<\/p>\n
If our promoters of plant pain weren’t so blunt serious, this
\nmight all be very funny. Indeed, good puns and amusing gaffs
\nresult from an incongruous and inapposite word usage. For
\nexample, someone once stole the seats from all the toilets in a
\nCanadian RCMP station. The official press release by the
\nMounties said that they still had nothing to go on. Methinks our
\npain promoters also have nothing to go on.<\/p>\n
4. Error #4: REMOTE PARALLELS DO NOT MAKE FOR IDENTITIES<\/p>\n
Now, we have been entertained by our plant pain promoters of some
\ninteresting facts like that of oak trees diverting some of its
\nactivity to an increase production of tannic acid in respond to,
\nsay, a Gypsy moth invasion. We are informed that:<\/p>\n
> There IS a parallel here, and the relative complexity of the
\n> sensory and interpretive mechanisms is irrelevant.<\/p>\n
The cruel fact remains, however, that PARALLELS DO NOT MAKE FOR
\nIDENTITIES. Indeed, how something is achieved is just as
\nimportant as what is being achieved in order to properly
\nattribute there to be identity. For animals, conscious
\nmotivation to avoid pain figures very large in how they would
\navoid or mitigate pain. Pain is not something that is unfelt.
\nIt makes no sense to speak of “unfelt, unconscious pain”, yet our
\nplant pain promoters will insist upon there being a morally
\nrelevant parallel.<\/p>\n
To illustrate this point about identity, please permit me to work
\nfrom a different and more familiar example. Now, it has been
\nargued that computers “think” as evidence by their capacity to
\nmanipulate symbols. What shall we make of this?.<\/p>\n
Searle’s (1980) well-known Chinese room argument, however, at
\nleast makes clear that computers as syntactic engines are not
\n“understanders” of language even if they should one day be
\nsuccessful at translating from Chinese to English back to
\nChinese. The subjective life and mind accompanying a person’s
\nperformances would seem to involve more than the computer’s
\nsuperior efficiency at manipulating data according to sequences
\nof algorithm-governed operations. To even here speak of “rule-
\ngoverned operations” is misleading since it suggests we can talk
\nof these machines under the description of them “following
\nrules”. Shanker (1987) makes the case that this violates our
\nlogical grammar of rule-following being a normative rather a
\nmechanical action and that it is an action predicated on some
\nnecessary minimal “understanding” of the rule. Due to the
\nliteral ascription implied by this trope about computers, we are
\nlapsing into the same kind of conceptual confusion that would
\noccur if we were to literally ascribe to the members of a meeting
\nthat they were following Robert’s rules of order even though they
\nwere ignorant of, or did not understand the rules. If we were to
\nsay such a thing, it would only be FIGURATIVE for simply saying
\nthat the members just happen to be inadvertently or unknowingly
\nabiding by Robert’s rules. Notwithstanding the generosities of
\nidealization and wishful rhetoric, the computer analogue still
\nremains a metaphor and one that too often invites a misleading
\nanthropomorphism (Dreyfus, 1987).<\/p>\n
Indeed, as the problems of the computer metaphor are becoming
\nmore widely appreciated and, as Michie (1982) notes, the former
\nheuristic value of the metaphor is being replaced by more exact
\nand fruitful formalizations and mathematics, the metaphor is
\nbeginning to become less frequent in the scientific prose of AI
\nscience itself. While anthropomorphic speculation inaugurated
\nboth the animal and computer models, it is a circumspect
\nanthropomorphism tempered with naturalism that now appears to be
\nthe most fruitful approach for the understanding of animals
\n(Griffin, 1981), but it is an “objectivist”, or more precisely an
\nelectrical-mechanical and symbolic-mathematical prose, that is
\nmore fitting for AI. With respect to plants, the language of
\nmental states is simply addleheaded and daft.<\/p>\n
5. Error #5: OVER-INTERPRETATION OF ESTABLISHED FACTS<\/p>\n
Now, we have been told that “there IS some evidence which shows
\nthat plants are “sentient”, in the broad sense of the word.”
\nHmm., more likely the narrow and twisted sense of the word. But
\nagain, all we have is simply the interesting but morally
\nirrelevant facts about plants reacting to certain noxious
\nstimuli, or to the signalling molecules of other plants under
\nattack. We are then asked about how this might be different from
\nour own sense of smell. They would ask, “is this not equivalent
\nto plant sensation or of a plant sensing its environment?” By
\nnow, we should be able to readily reply that such usage simply
\nstretches our ordinary definitions of the word “sense”. Mere
\nbehavioural reactions and avoidance to certain stimuli is
\ninsufficient for the attributions of mental states like that of
\nperceptions and knowing sensation. Again, we have either an
\nequivocation of usage to bootleg false conclusion, or we simply
\nhave a re-defninition of our ordinary meanings to something
\nidiosyncratic and morally irrelevant. HOW the plants do what
\nthey do is just as important as the function of what those
\nreactions subserve.<\/p>\n
Here is an example of over-interpretation that was due to this
\nerror of only observing the end result and not the means. It was
\nonce thought that army ants were comprised of a strategic
\nmilitary column marching through the forest with direction,
\npurpose and foresight. Well, it turns out that these ants simply
\nfollow the smell of the ants in front, and in turn the leading
\nants simply, in a somewhat random manner, lurch or are, pushed
\nforward. If these ants were to be placed on a flat surface and
\nthe leading ants were to make a circle back to the rump end of
\nthe column, the marching column of ants would simply go around
\nand around until they died. Where is the intentional purpose,
\nplanning and foresight? There is no scouting ahead of the
\nterrain, no deliberative leadership, just a very simply mechanism
\nthat under normal conditions in the uneven terrain of the forest
\nworks very effectively to keep the ants ever moving forward in
\nsearch new food supplies. The key point is that for many
\ncenturies people over-interpreted what was going on simply
\nbecause they only observed the overt functional behaviours and
\nnot the means and enabling conditions for those behaviours.<\/p>\n
6. THE BELIEF IN NON-EXISTENT PAINS. \ud83d\ude42<\/p>\n
Patient reader, permit me to finish with one last observation.
\nHypochondriacs are, as you know, people who believe in pains that
\nsimply don’t exist. This much they have in common with our plant
\npain promoters. Of course, hypochondriacs also are easily
\npersuaded that they must themselves have what even the most
\nsuperficial description of an illness would describe. I’ll leave
\nit to the reader to decide if this parallel also applies to our
\nplant pain promoters. Now, there is the amusing story of one
\nsuch person who after hearing a lecture on diseases of the
\nkidney, immediately phoned his doctor. The good doctor patiently
\nexplained that in that particular disease there were no pains or
\ndiscomfort of any kind, whereupon our hypochondriac gasped, “I
\nknew it, my symptoms exactly!” \ud83d\ude42<\/p>\n
ted<\/p>\n
REFERENCES<\/p>\n
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1987). Misrepresenting human intelligence.
\n In Rainer Born (Ed.), Artificial intelligence: The case
\n against. London: Croom Helm.
\nGriffin, Donald R. (1981). The question of animal awareness:
\n Evolutionary continuity of mental experience (2nd ed.).
\n California: William Kaufmann. Another good book that I
\n would highly recommend.
\nMichie, Donald (1982). Machine intelligence and related topics.
\n London: Gordon & Breach Science Publishers.
\nSearle, J. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and
\n Brain Sciences, 3, 417-457.
\nShanker, S. G. (1987). The decline and fall of the mechanist
\n metaphor. In Rainer Born (Ed.), Artificial intelligence:
\n The case against. London: Croom Helm.
\nTaylor, Charles (1964). The explanation of behaviour. London:
\n Routledge & Kegan Paul.<\/p>\n
